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Transforming Legal Aid: Does Price Competitive Tendering Potentially Create Travesties 
of justice? 
 Lucy Welsh considers the potential effects of the governmentǯs proposals to reform publicly 
funded access to justice in criminal proceedings. 
 
Introduction 
Legal aid in criminal proceedings exists to avoid defendants being presented as victims of an 
overbearing state, which assumes that ǲthe two sides have access to roughly equivalent resources and expertiseǳ (Young et al, 1996; 5). Recent governments have however focussed on value for 
money, which ignores political debate about what actually constitutes value in specific 
circumstances. It is against this background that the Ministry of Justice released its consultation 
paper including proposals to introduce Price Competitive Tendering ȋǮPCTǯȌ in most criminal 
proceedings.  
 
Under the PCT model, the government proposes to invite firms to bid for a market share of criminal 
defence work. The successful bidders will be entitled to an Ǯequalǯ Ǯmarketǯ share . So in Kent, where it 
is proposed there will be five providers, each successful firm will be allocated a twenty per cent 
share of the work, although allocation processes remain undetermined.  In crude terms, the firms 
which offer to do the work at the lowest price will be awarded the contracts. The accused person 
might (in a government u-turn) retain choice about which provider will provide representation, but 
it will be near impossible to change provider after initial allocation. That allocation is supposed to 
take place at the investigation stage but it is not clear what will happen to the significant number of 
people who choose to be unrepresented at the police station but subsequently seek out a lawyer  
after being charged with a criminal offence. All bids are to be capped at 17.5% of 2012/13 payment 
rates, so all current providers who bid will have to demonstrate a real cut in fee income. The 
government suggests that the volume of work conducted will enable firms to make economies of 
scale, but does not suggest how this might actually be achieved.  
 
Money matters 
When the report of the Rushcliffe Committee was published as the precursor to the Legal Aid and 
Advice Act 1949, it made clear that  advocates who were funded to represent defendants via legal aid 
should receive Ǯadequate remunerationǯ because the adversarial process depends on the partiesǯ 
ability to access resources to adequately prepare their case. The proposal to introduce PCT flies in 
the face of that acknowledgment. Profit margins for publicly funded providers of representation in 
criminal proceedings are already very slim (Grindley, 2006) resulting in a fragile market which is 
unlikely to be able to withstand the introduction of radical reforms. This would result in long term 
sustainability problems (Grindley, 2006). There have been further cuts since Grindley (2006) 
conducted his analysis. While the consultation document suggests that bids which appear to be 
unusually low would require firms to demonstrate sustainability, it is impossible to predict  this 
given the uncertainties of work volumes and overhead expenses. Furthermore, there is no 
acknowledgement that, after the initial round of contracts and loss of significant numbers of firms 
from the market, those firms that are left will be in a strong position to increase their bid prices 
disproportionately. There will be little ability for new providers to enter a market which has already 
been allocated among providers as a result of the significant overheads required to establish a firm 
large enough to cover bid areas, meaning that competitive threat from other practices will be at a 
minimum. From a policy perspective, this potentially places providers in a strong position against 
the Legal Aid Agency.  
 
Efficiency and Quality 
The efficiency of the criminal justice system largely depends on the co-operative practices that exist 
between advocates and the court. There is a wealth of information which supports the idea that the 
presence of lawyers facilitates the smooth administration of the proceedings (see, for example, 
Young et al, 1996). Indeed, co-operative working practices have been encouraged by policy 
initiatives such as Criminal Justice: Simple, Speedy, Summary and Stop Delaying Justice! While the 
proposals do not suggest otherwise, what they failed to recognise is that, via the removal of client choice ȋwhich reduces the need to provide a good serviceȌ and Ǯguaranteedǯ levels of work ȋthe 
existence of which is not accepted), there is no incentive on defence advocates to co-operate with the 
courts, or initiatives that the government proposes, as professional reputations no longer matter. 
Streamlining practices so that less time is spent on cases in attempts to achieve economies of scale 
does not necessarily mean that practitioners will co-operate to get cases dealt with quickly. Less 
time is likely to be spent on cases, which may result in inadequate preparation and longer term 
inefficiencies such as an increase in the number of ineffective trials. Furthermore, the socio-
economic costs of potential miscarriages of justice which could occur do not appear to have been 
considered.  
 
Kemp (2010) noted that changes in payment regimes can affect the behaviour of solicitors who are 
torn between cost control measures and quality of service. The introduction of PCT, and the 
proposed reduction in funding in those areas not subject to PCT, are likely to exacerbate such 
problems. Furthermore, low levels of remuneration not only have a detrimental impact on the 
quality of advice and representation received, but also exacerbate the problems that already exist in 
attracting new trainees to the profession (Kemp, 2010) which will have an impact on diversity.  
 
There is no incentive under PCT to provide a good quality service as the only thing that matters is 
cost. In order to monitor the professions, the government seeks to rely on measures such as Lexcel 
or the Specialist Quality Mark (regimes which require certain prescribed activities and standards to be met in order to be awarded a Ǯquality markǯȌ, processes of peer  review or the Quality Assurance 
Scheme for Advocates (in which advocates state which level of advocacy they are able to perform 
and are then reviewed). The requirements of Lexcel and Specialist Quality Mark are management 
tools unrelated to actual quality of advice and representation. Peer Review was only conducted on 
the basis of file reviews rather than an evaluation of performance in person. The future of the Quality 
Assurance Scheme for Advocates is in turmoil following threats of strike action by the criminal Bar. 
The defendant can therefore be assured of good management, but not necessarily of good advice. 
However, Article 6 European Convention on (uman Rights ȋǮEC(RǯȌ requires member states to 
provide access to publicly funded defence services for those accused of crimes that cannot afford to 
pay for representation. It is not just the provision of a lawyer that matters – the defendant must be 
able to access resources which enable effective participation in the proceedings and have access to 
adequate resources to properly prepare his or her case. There is no incentive under PCT to provide a 
good quality service as the only thing that matters is cost. The quality control mechanisms proposed 
by the government are insufficient to monitor the quality of legal advice and advocacy services. 
Therefore, the proposals place the UK at risk of breaching the provisions of the ECHR to provide 
adequate resources in the preparation of defences.   
 
Reductions in the quality of legal services as a result of competitive tendering have been recorded in 
other jurisdictions that have introduced similar models (Goriely, 1998). In addition, Hynes and Robins found ǲthere is evidence from the experience of contracting for criminal legal aid services in 
North America to indicate that there are reductions in quality and the creation of cartels which lead to an increase in costsǳ (Hynes et al, 2009; 55). This is because the proposals are based on ǲan overly simplistic belief in Ǯthe marketǯ being able to sort out the problem. But there was a failure to understand what Ǯthe problemǯ was, that the publicly funded legal sector has evolved in a complex and haphazard fashion, and is one that will not withstand shocksǳ (Hynes et al, 2009; 57).  The 
difficulty exists because the criminal justice system is, quite simply, not a rational market – it is 
almost impossible to quantify how many people will require representation and what their needs 
will be. It is therefore unlikely that the system could Ǯguaranteeǯ levels of work to a degree that 
would allow for effective business planning.   
 
Conclusions 
The Ministry of Justice suggests that PCT is a painful but necessary measure to reduce expenditure 
and improve public confidence in the system. There is no evidence that the public lack confidence in 
the system. Further, the government has failed to properly examine sources of expense in summary 
criminal proceedings. Cape and Moorhead note several factors which have increased cost - such as 
increased case complexity resulting in increased trial length and changes in prosecutorial decision 
making (Cape et al, 2005). The government does not appear to have considered these issues in its 
desire to reduce expenditure. Instead the government seeks to impose managerial influences which represent ǲa challenge to the direct relationship with the clientǳ ȋYoung et al, 1996; 23) in favour of 
conveyor belt processing and deskilling (Young et al, 1996).  
 Furthermore, the rapidity with which it is proposed that this scheme will be implemented will not 
allow the already fragile market to make the significant structural changes necessary for PCT to be 
sustainable in the long term, meaning that any potential savings are at risk of being offset by the 
problems which emerge at later stages. There is a real risk that the prioritisation of management and 
economic imperatives over principled decision making will result in miscarriages of justice – and 
that is only if the criminal justice system remains viable at all.  
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